

10 October 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Staff Meeting Minutes of 10 October 1979

The Director chaired the meeting; Mr. Carlucci was [] on official business. []

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Lehman said it appears Egypt's planning date for a military offensive against Libya has been moved to 1 April 1980. He noted a report that Fidel Castro may arrive in New York City tonight. Lehman showed the

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Lipton reported all but [] of last year's funds have been expended. He commended the Directorates for exceptionally good planning and programming of 1979 expenditures; he said the unspent amount is less than it has been in recent years. []

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Hetu commented briefly on an "interesting" article, "The Other Side of Secrecy," in today's Washington Post (attached). []

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Clarke commented that we are in a time of heavy concentration on Cuba, the Caribbean and Central America. He noted the number of recent requests from Dr. Brzezinski and others for detailed reports on this area of the world; he noted also a hearing scheduled by the HAC for sometime before 1 November. Relatedly, Clarke said work is well underway on a comprehensive paper in response to a request from Mr. Carlucci and David Aaron; he said he wishes such a paper could serve to answer all related requests. Clarke said it would be most helpful if the hearing requested by HAC could be put off till after 1 November; Hitz said he would work on it. []

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Hitz said he will be meeting later today with Clarke and Ernst to deal with queries from HPSCI's Tom Latimer toward Representative Aspin's Subcommittee hearing scheduled for next week on our recent oil study. In response to the Director as to why the hearing is being held, Hitz opined it is simply a self-serving exposure technique by Aspin who will soon run for the governorship of Wisconsin. Despite this obvious tactic by Aspin, Hitz said Committee Chairman Boland is reluctant to interfere and that Latimer is caught in the role of peacemaker between a reluctant chairman and an aggressive committee member. []

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Hitz said more than a reasonable time has passed in our wait to inform appropriate Congressional committees on a technology transfer violation [redacted]. Hitz and Clarke agreed to get together and work this out. [redacted]

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In response to a query from Hitz, the Director said he had nothing to add to the briefing he provided some 10 days ago to Senators Bayh and Goldwater on a sensitive matter. [redacted]

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Silver reported on his pre-meeting yesterday with Ken Bass, Department of Justice, toward the Director's meeting next week with the Attorney General re E.O. 12036 procedures. Silver explained what he is accomplishing with Bass and that he will provide the Director with a paper for that meeting. [redacted]

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Silver said the situation re Charters Legislation is uncertain; he opined this legislation is being put aside until completion of the SALT hearings. [redacted]

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Silver said he will circulate to several independent offices and the Office of the Director information on procedures regarding the handling of information--collection, storage, dissemination--on U.S. persons. He noted Directorates are operating under specific procedures and said we should have this worked out Agency-wide before dealing with the Congressional committees on this matter. Relatedly, Waller described surveys and inspections conducted by his office on this matter and that the results have been provided to the IOB; he said this was done to preclude IOB's Kujovich from conducting an internal investigation of his own. [redacted]

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[redacted] said he has been unsuccessful in trying to pin down OMB's Randy Jayne to schedule a meeting on the overseas manpower issue. He said he has picked up background information from OMB's Arnie Donahue but many problems created by the OMB/State study need to be addressed.

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The Director commented favorably on the new NIE format. He said also the President has read the NIE on Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia, noting the President's comment: "The main unanswered question is--through what means the Soviets can present such a threat to Yugoslavia?" Clarke said his people are working on this. [redacted]

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TOP SECRET

SECRET

The Director summarized this morning's SCC meeting which dealt with Brezhnev's recent speech and described members' points of view noting that the Brezhnev speech and proposals amount to an MBFR without rules, which raises many questions, e.g., verification of Brezhnev's proposal re withdrawal of tanks and the feasibility of verifying Brezhnev's proposal for a 20,000 manpower reduction. Discussion followed on the various aspects of the proposal in terms of match and mismatch with NATO. Clarke provided further background stemming from other recent meetings on this topic. The Director said he would like sometime soon to sit with some analysts to muse this whole situation. []

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The Director said he will be in Hot Springs (Homestead) on Friday to meet with the Business Council; he solicited any comments or questions pertinent to this visit which he said he would be glad to pursue. Stein said [] has been prepared for him re this visit. []

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The Director said he is very pleased with two or three papers he has received re proposed initiatives which might be pursued as a follow-on to the President's reference to the importance of intelligence in his Cuba speech. He thanked [] particularly for providing a good balance of collectors' interests. []

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The Director announced the Executive Committee, which has been operating under the auspices of the Comptroller, will now operate under the Office of the DDCI. []

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The Director was pleased to announce that Maury Lipton has agreed to assume the position of Comptroller, CIA. []

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Complimenting Fred Hitz on a superb performance as the Legislative Council, the Director announced the Legislative Council's position has been raised to the EP-5 level. []

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Attachment

SECRET

Fred Reed

The Other Side of Secrecy

A sort of war, declared in the 1960s, continues to rage between the CIA and segments of the press. Because I know little of the CIA, as do most of its critics, I will maintain a journalistically unusual silence regarding the agency's alleged culpabilities. A few thoughts on the nature of intelligence are very much in order.

The first should be obvious, but somehow isn't: intelligence is important. Wars are won, lost, begun, extended and averted on the basis of intelligence. Verification of SALT is an intelligence matter. Pearl Harbor resulted from inadequate handling of inadequate intelligence and added perhaps two years to a bloody war. Countries do not spend billions on intelligence agencies because they can think of nothing else to do with the money.

A second point follows: the Pentagon's concern with secrecy is perfectly reasonable. Many disagree. I have heard reporters, a few of whom seem a bit trigger-happy about the right to know, suggest that secrecy is the Pentagon's way of hiding its mistakes. Doubtless it is, bureaucrats being bureaucrats: To a military man, rather more than bureaucratic gamesmanship is at stake. For example, an aircraft's principal protection in many missions is its electronics. If the enemy knows too much about a plane's circuitry, the pilot will be, quite simply, dead. Pilots do not see the humor in espionage.

A third point is that intelligence is an extremely technical business. Considerable mathematical background is needed for even a Scientific American understanding of cryptography. Books exist on the unclassified aspects of espionage,


but they are heavy reading. A fair foundation in electronics is necessary even to realize how much one doesn't know. Reporters, unfortunately, are seldom technically minded people. I doubt whether one in 50 knows traffic analysis from a trapdoor function.

The lack of background can cause reasonable behavior to seem petty and arbitrary. As a hypothetical example, the Air Force may publish a photograph of a reconnaissance aircraft. A reporter takes a picture of the aircraft at a different angle and doesn't understand why the Air Force confiscates his film. He doesn't realize that he has photographed a radar antenna and doesn't know that resolving power is deducible

from antenna configuration. This happens. I have seen Israeli military censors exasperate photographers by deleting "harmless" battlefield photographs. They weren't harmless.

Another point is illustrated by the CIA's attempt some years back to raise a sunken Russian submarine. The effort cost an enormous sum and involved a special salvage ship built by Howard Hughes. When the newspapers learned of the project, a furor ensued. Commentators said the salvage was a waste of money and a puerile adventure. One writer decided that the whole thing was an elaborate ploy by which Hughes duped the agency into buying him a ship.

Maybe it was all three. I don't know.



By Brooks Stauffer

"Whether a particular agency behaves well is arguable; the necessity of intelligence and counterintelligence is not."

The writer is a columnist for Federal Times.

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and neither did the commentators. Whether the submarine was worth the price depends on a great deal of technical information, all of it highly secret and unavailable to commentators. Suppose the submarine's technology proved to be adequately primitive, making a proposed \$10 billion defensive system unnecessary. Would the value of the submarine then be \$10 billion? Putting a dollar value on information is difficult.

The agency tried to persuade the press not to publicize the incident. Commentators immediately inferred that the agency wanted to conceal its misdeeds. Maybe it did; yet little acuity is needed to see that some intelligence is valuable only if the other side doesn't know you have it.

Codes, for example. Submarines carry code books or the electronic equivalent. If the Soviets know we have their code, they will simply change it. Further, intelligence agencies obviously must keep tape files of intercepted Soviet radio-traffic, waiting for a windfall to allow them their decoding. Again, knowing the code had been compromised, the Russians would make changes to negate much of the value of the information.

In other words, an expensive project can be rendered valueless by publicity. Whether it happened in this case, I don't know. Oddly, the possibility did not receive wide discussion in print.

A conclusion from the foregoing might be that a little discretion is desirable. Whether a particular agency behaves well is arguable; the necessity of intelligence and counterintelligence is not. The automatic assumption that the CIA is up to no good is unfair; the refusal to consider both sides of the question is disturbing. And an intelligence agency, by the nature of its job, cannot give a detailed defense.